[Download] "People State New York v. Charles Okafore" by Court of Appeals of New York # Book PDF Kindle ePub Free

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Title: People State New York v. Charles Okafore
Author : Court of Appeals of New York
Release Date : January 09, 1988
Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
Pages : * pages
Size : 68 KB

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[72 N.Y.2d 81 Page 83] Opinion OF THE COURT In Matter of Johnson v Morgenthau (69 N.Y.2d 148), we determined that criminal possession of a weapon
in the third degree was a continuing crime. We found, therefore, that although the defendant had unlawfully possessed a weapon
in The Bronx and Manhattan during a continuous six-day period only one crime had been committed. As a result, double jeopardy
principles prohibited New York County from prosecuting him for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after
he had been placed in jeopardy for the same crime in Bronx County. In the matter before us, defendant has been separately
charged and convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as a result of incidents occurring approximately
an hour apart, one in Bronx County and the other in New York County. He contends that second degree possession is also a continuing
crime and that his later New York County conviction must be set aside on double jeopardy grounds. The crimes of second and
third degree criminal possession of a weapon differ significantly, however. Third degree, examined in Johnson (supra), is
defined by reference to dominion and control, whereas second degree requires a specific intent, the "intent to use the same
unlawfully against another" (Penal Law Â§ 265.03). Thus, second degree is a continuing offense only as long as a defendant
possesses the weapon intending to use it against a particular person or group of persons. If that intent abates, the crime
is completed, even though defendant continues to possess the weapon, and a subsequently formed intent while possessing the
weapon results in the commission of a second offense. In this case, defendant's possession of the weapon was continuous but
the intent with which he possessed it was separate and discrete in the two charged incidents. He thus committed two offenses
and could be prosecuted for both.